ASEAN Member States’ Engagement with Myanmar’s Junta Gives Political Space to Continued Violence Against Civilians and the Rohingya
Analysis by Ahtaram Shin — Writer and Editor, Rohingyatographer
The suffering of Myanmar's people in the hands of the military junta
The junta's fiercest battle is not being waged against external threats or economic stagnation. It is being fought by the military regime against its own citizens simply to hold power. Through ruthless oppression, rights violations and ethnic discrimination, the junta has turned state power into an instrument of domestic terror, actively sabotaging any path towards democracy, religious liberty, inclusive diversity and an end to mass killing.
Since the 2021 coup, the military has dragged citizens from every walk of life into its violence, including teachers, doctors, farmers, ethnic minorities, students and people living in cities. Many participated in the resistance movement, the Civil Disobedience Movement, boycotts and protests after the coup, and they have faced arrest, displacement and persecution. The scale of the crisis continues to grow. According to UNICEF's 2026 humanitarian assessment, 16.2 million people, including 4.9 million children, require humanitarian assistance in Myanmar in 2026, while nearly 3.8 million people were internally displaced by June.
The suffering of Myanmar people is timeless and endless. Ordinary civilians across Myanmar continue to face military attacks, displacement and insecurity. On 28 September 2026, a military airstrike struck a crowded market in Kyauktaw Township, Rakhine State. At least 50 people were reportedly killed and 58 injured, including women and children, according to the United Nations Human Rights Office. The market had more than 200 shops and served different communities, including Rakhine, Rohingya, Hindu and Daingnet people. This was one of the deadliest attacks reported in Rakhine since the 2021 coup.
“The military has shown again and again that it has no regard for civilian lives and development of the nation. Civilians are killed like in drama serial and slowly destroying a generation in 21 century.”
The suffering of the Rohingya comes on top of decades of persecution, discrimination, displacement and denial of citizenship. The Rohingya have experienced mass violence and forced displacement, and international accountability proceedings concerning Myanmar's treatment of the Rohingya remain ongoing. The genocide case brought by The Gambia before the International Court of Justice has now gone through public hearings on the merits in January 2026, but the Court has not yet issued a final judgment. At the same time, the International Criminal Court is investigating alleged crimes against humanity against the Rohingya. In November 2024, the ICC Prosecutor applied for an arrest warrant for Min Aung Hlaing, stating that there were reasonable grounds to believe he bears criminal responsibility for the alleged crimes against humanity of deportation and persecution of the Rohingya.
This is the country to which Malaysia is now considering sending some of the people it holds in detention. The return of people to their country is normally understood as a sign that a crisis has ended. But what happens when the country to which people are being returned remains engulfed in armed conflict, political repression, mass displacement and the same genocidal track?
ASEAN member states' friendship and engagement with the junta
The problem becomes even more serious when ASEAN member states themselves continue to maintain close relationships with Myanmar's military junta. Diplomatic engagement can be necessary during a crisis. But when such engagement happens without sufficient pressure for an end to violence, it can give the junta political space and confidence while civilians continue to suffer.
ASEAN has its own Five-Point Consensus on Myanmar, calling for an immediate cessation of violence, dialogue among the parties, humanitarian assistance and engagement with all relevant stakeholders. But what has changed for the people of Myanmar? In its own 2025 review of the Five-Point Consensus, ASEAN acknowledged the “lack of substantive progress” in implementation and again condemned continued violence against civilians. At the same time, ASEAN continued its official engagement with Myanmar representatives in 2026, including meetings between the ASEAN Secretary-General and Myanmar's representatives.
Thailand, for example, is heavily involved in addressing transnational organised crime, human trafficking, narcotics and cyber-scam networks operating along its border with military-controlled areas of Myanmar. These issues show how deeply the crisis has affected the wider region. Yet, even as ASEAN member states deal with the consequences of the Myanmar crisis, they continue their political and diplomatic engagement with Naypyidaw.
The junta therefore sees that, despite the violence, it is still able to maintain relationships with neighbouring governments. This creates a serious contradiction:
“ASEAN speaks about ending violence against civilians, while some of its member states continue strengthening their relationships with the military junta who is responsible for that violence.”
ASEAN member states have witnessed the bloodshed and suffering of the Rohingya and many other peoples of Myanmar. Yet the military authorities continue to receive diplomatic attention and regional engagement. Friendship and engagement without meaningful pressure can fuel the junta's confidence to continue its campaign against civilians. The problem is not diplomacy itself. The problem is when diplomacy continues without meaningful consequences for those carrying out the violence.
Malaysia's repatriation and invitation to Min Aung Hlaing
Malaysia's recent repatriation programme is one of the clearest examples of this contradiction. On 29 September, Malaysia sent back 1,476 Myanmar nationals in the first phase of a programme involving around 5,000 people. The Malaysian government described the returns as voluntary. But only one day earlier, the Myanmar military had carried out the deadly strike on the Kyauktaw market in Rakhine. How could people be told that returning to Myanmar is safe when civilians were being killed in one of the same country's conflict areas the day before?
There is an important distinction that must be made clear. Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim said that none of the first 1,476 people returned on 29 September were Rohingya, although the wider repatriation arrangement involves people from different ethnic communities and the issue of Rohingya returns remains under discussion. The concern, however, remains the same: Malaysia is returning people to a country where armed conflict continues, civilians remain at risk and independent UN investigators say conditions in Rakhine are not yet conducive to safe, voluntary, dignified and sustainable return.
UNHCR has directly raised concerns about the first returns. In its 30 September statement on Malaysia's repatriation, UNHCR said people sent back to Myanmar may face serious risks and noted that those returned had been held in immigration detention. Because UNHCR did not have access to the individuals before the return, it said it could not assess whether their decisions to return were genuinely free and informed.
Behind the term “voluntary” can have different meanings. When people are held in detention and have no clear legal route out, we must ask whether their decision to return is genuinely free and informed. A person returning to Myanmar needs more than a promise that they will not be harmed. They need to know:
Where exactly will they live?
Will they have legal identity documents and citizenship rights?
Will their property be protected?
Can they safely travel?
Will they have access to education and healthcare?
Who will protect them if fighting reaches their area?
Can independent organisations monitor their situation?
What happens if they are arrested after returning?
Can they leave again if conditions deteriorate?
For Rohingya returnees, there are some additional questions that are unavoidable:
Will they be recognised as citizens?
Will they be allowed to return to their original villages?
Will they have freedom of movement?
What security arrangements will protect them?
And what justice will they receive for the genocidal crimes committed against them?
The Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar has warned that conditions in Rakhine State are not yet conducive to safe, voluntary, dignified and sustainable return. Without credible answers to these questions, “repatriation” can become merely a transfer of vulnerability from one country to another, like deportation.
Malaysia says it is pursuing a diplomatic solution, that the returns are voluntary, and that it has obtained safety assurances. What kind of diplomacy can there be with dictators and alleged perpetrators of serious international crimes? Malaysia's diplomacy should be with the people of Myanmar, not only with the military authorities. The military junta does not represent Myanmar or its people.
Malaysia is also a country where anti-Rohingya campaigns and hostile narratives have become increasingly visible. At the same time, Malaysia is holding large numbers of people from Myanmar in immigration detention. As of February 2026, UNHCR recorded 193,824 refugees and asylum-seekers from Myanmar in Malaysia, including 126,144 Rohingya. Malaysia is not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention, and refugees and asylum-seekers have no formal refugee status under Malaysian law.
I talked with several detained Rohingya who described the brutality of Malaysian detention centres, where they said people were kept in degrading conditions, with insufficient food and limited access to treatment. Similarly, another Myanmar detainee told me that going back to the hell of Myanmar would be better than living indefinitely in a Malaysian detention centre. These are individual testimonies, but they show why we should not treat the word “voluntary” as if it automatically means that a person has made a free and informed decision.
According to Reuters' report on the visit, the talks focused on strengthening bilateral ties and issues including the repatriation of Myanmar nationals. The following day, Anwar said Malaysia would do “whatever possible” to work with Myanmar and ensure its reintegration into the ASEAN community, while also thanking Min Aung Hlaing for accepting the repatriation of 10,493 Myanmar nationals.
This is happening while the military continues its attacks on civilians. Malaysia began its first repatriation operation immediately after the 28 September market attack in Rakhine, and now the leader of Myanmar's military-backed government is receiving a formal welcome in Kuala Lumpur while further returns are being discussed.
As Malaysia has already sent the first batch back to Myanmar and is now discussing further returns with Min Aung Hlaing, the Malaysian government should think carefully about the consequences. A military authority that cannot guarantee the rights and safety of its own civilians while its forces continue attacking them cannot simply guarantee the safety of people being returned from another country.
“Malaysian will be responsible if a single soul dies in the hands of dictators among those it pushes back,” said Ali Jinnah.
Malaysia can use its diplomatic position differently. Instead of making agreements with the military authorities primarily around the return of refugees and migrants, it could use its regional influence to push the military to stop attacks on civilians, allow humanitarian access and support international efforts to hold perpetrators accountable.
When Malaysia invites Min Aung Hlaing while simultaneously returning Myanmar nationals to the same military-controlled country, the message to victims is deeply troubling. It risks creating the impression that maintaining diplomatic relationships has become more important than confronting the conditions that forced people to flee in the first place..
What should ASEAN do?
ASEAN should not allow the junta's authority to become stronger through regional relationships while civilians continue to suffer. The Five-Point Consensus was made in response to the Myanmar crisis, but ASEAN should not allow it to become a mechanism that simply keeps talking with the junta. ASEAN needs to work with the people of Myanmar and all relevant stakeholders.
First, ASEAN should stop supporting or strengthening the junta through political and diplomatic engagement that gives the military authorities legitimacy or confidence while they continue killing civilians. Diplomatic engagement should be connected to meaningful pressure and concrete outcomes, especially an end to attacks on civilians and access for humanitarian organisations.
Second, ASEAN should insist on protecting Myanmar civilians from the hands of the junta. Civilians should not be left without protection while the military continues attacks across the country. More than 3.7 million people were internally displaced by mid-2026, while 16.2 million people needed humanitarian assistance, according to UNICEF's 2026 figures. These are not signs that the country is returning to normal. They are signs that the crisis is continuing.
Third, ASEAN should engage with all stakeholders and resistance groups in Myanmar instead of engaging primarily with the junta. Its own Five-Point Consensus refers to engagement with relevant stakeholders. ASEAN should implement this principle genuinely rather than allowing the military authorities to remain the main gateway to political dialogue.
Fourth, ASEAN should establish a clear regional position on non-refoulement. A person's lack of legal status in a neighbouring country should never, by itself, justify sending that person into foreseeable danger. UNHCR has warned that people returned from Malaysia may face serious risks, while the UN Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar has said that current conditions in Rakhine are not conducive to safe, voluntary, dignified and sustainable return.
Fifth, ASEAN should create or strengthen a regional accountability and documentation mechanism to preserve evidence of serious violations. Justice may take years, but evidence disappears much faster. The work of the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar shows why preserving evidence is important while alleged perpetrators remain in positions of power.
Finally, ASEAN should develop a long-term political process that addresses the causes of Myanmar's crisis—not merely the management of refugees. ASEAN should also make clear that no repatriation can be considered sustainable without genuine safety, citizenship rights where applicable, freedom of movement, access to basic services, independent monitoring and accountability.
The crisis in Myanmar cannot be solved by returning people to danger. It cannot be solved by diplomatic handshakes alone. And it cannot be solved by treating the suffering of civilians as an internal matter while maintaining friendship with those accused of causing that suffering.
ASEAN has a choice: continue managing the consequences of the crisis, or take meaningful steps to address its causes.
For the people of Myanmar, and especially for the Rohingya, the difference is not diplomatic.
It is the difference between returning to safety and returning to suffering.
Rohingyatographer’s work is supported by the Global Statelessness Fund. The views expressed are those of the author.
